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This paper analyses the economics of long-term gas contracts under changing institutional 
conditions, mainly gas sector liberalisation. The paper is motivated by the increasingly tense 
debate in continental Europe, UK and the US on the security of long-term gas supply. We 
discuss the main issues regarding long-term contracts, i.e. the changing role of the flexibility 
clause, the effect of abandoning the destination clause, and the strategic behaviour of 
producers between long-term sales and spot-sales. The literature suggests consumers and 
producers benefit from risk hedging through long-term contracts. Furthermore long-term 
contracts may reduce exercise of market power. This was argued to benefit consumers at the 
‘expense’ of producers’ profits. Our analysis shows if the long-run demand elasticity is 
significantly lower than the short-run elasticity, both strategic producers and consumers 
benefit from lower prices and larger market volume. Some policy implications of the findings 
are also discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
The theory of (long-term) contracts has been in the core of industrial organization and energy 
economics for a long time, and it is currently experiencing a “renaissance” in the rising debate on 
supply security in liberalized electricity and natural gas markets (Helm, 2002, Oren, 2003, Neuhoff 
and De Vries 2004). The role of long-term contracts is particularly debated in the natural gas industry, 
where continental Europe is currently pondering liberalization following the policy of the U.S. (1980s) 
and the UK (1990s). Amid rising demand and increasing prices for natural gas around the world, the 
European Commission has withdrawn its juridical action against long-term contracts between 
exporting countries and EU-importers, but remains cautious, as do many member states. It is time to 
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revive the theoretical and policy debates of the 1980s, when MIT conducted the first large-scale study 
on international gas trade (Adelman, et al., 1986). 
This paper has two objectives: first, we provide a balanced discussion of the role of long-term 
contracts in natural gas markets, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In particular, we 
discuss what parallels can be drawn between the developments in the US past liberalisation (1980s) 
and continental Europe today; second, we carry the theoretical debate a step further by explicitly 
taking into account the difference between the short-run and the long-run demand elasticities. Our 
model shows that if the long-run demand elasticity is significantly higher than the short-run elasticity, 
gas producers prefer for an institutional arrangement that allows for long-term contracting. 
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following way: the next section provides a survey of 
the literature on long-term contracts, with a focus on the natural gas industry. Section 3 provides 
empirical evidence of the developments of long-term contracts and natural gas prices in the US and in 
Europe; we also derive a stylized relation between the institutional environment regarding 
liberalisation and the gas price dynamics. Section 4 then develops the model. Based on work by Allaz 
and Vila (1993) on the nexus between future contracts and market power, we develop a model where 
oligopolists have a choice to enter long-term contracts or not, and where arbitrage between the long-
term market and short-term sales is possible. Allaz and Vila have suggested that consumers benefit 
from long-term contracting, because at each contracting stage producers sell additional output. The 
smaller the quantity producers sell subsequently at the spot market, the lower will be their incentive to 
reduce production and therefore the price will be lower. This low price is anticipated in all previous 
contracting stages. We show that not only gas consumers but also gas producers might benefit from 
signing long-term contracts. As the long-term contracts promise lower prices, consumers will place 
more investment in gas consuming equipment. This expands the market, and thus, long-term profits. 
The effect hinges on the difference between high demand elasticity in the long-term versus lower 
demand elasticity in the short-term. Section 5 concludes and derives some policy conclusions. 
 
2 Long-term Contracts: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches 
Long-term take-or-pay contracts (ToP) link sellers and buyers for a long period into a bilateral 
monopoly, generally 15 to 20 years, during which both of them have strictly defined obligations. In 
particular take-or-pay contracts require purchasers to pay for a pre-specified minimum quantity of gas 
whether or not that gas is actually taken, and require the producer to deliver this quantity (Masten, 
1988). In some regions, such as Europe and Asia, price indexation to oil as alternative fuel used to 
protect the buyer of gas on a long-term basis against prices above those for the main competing fuels. 
Risk sharing along the gas chain is settled by which the buyer bears the volume risk and the seller the 
price risk. On the other side of the scale, short-term trade and spot trade is carried out anonymously, 
without specific relations between the seller and the buyer. 
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The optimal contract portfolio (long-term, short-term, spot) is a topic in all commodity markets. In 
most of the commodity markets, short-term or spot markets have been implemented in the 1980s, and 
liquid trading has developed. On the other hand, as Newbery (1984) had observed early on, this 
trading occurs in an environment which is far from being competitive. This is well known in the 
OPEC-dominated crude oil market, but oligopolistic producer structures also prevail in natural gas, 
copper, aluminium, iron ore, and others. 
Due to the strategic character of natural gas for the energy supply, long-term contracts in this industry 
have attracted considerable interest for a long time, both in the U.S. and in Europe (Golombek, Hoel 
and Vislie, 1987). There are three streams in the literature on long-term contracts that can be 
distinguished:  
• The institutional economics literature interprets long-term contracts as a device to avoid the 
risks of opportunistic behaviour in deals involving high sunk investments, along the lines of 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1983). A higher asset-specificity of 
investments leads to more hierarchical contract structures, as opposed to market exchange. 
This literature is also interested in the repercussions between the contract length and the 
institutional framework, in particular the regulatory regime. Thus, Joskow (1987) shows, 
using coal contracts, that relationship-specific investments generally lead to longer term 
commitments between buyers and sellers. In the natural gas industry, Crocker and Masten 
(1985) and Masten and Crocker (1988) observe that in an inefficiently regulated commodity 
market, contract duration will be shorter than in an unregulated, competitive market. Mulherin 
(1986) tested contractual provisions in long-term natural gas contracts and contended that 
these were not an expression of market power, but rather resulted from attempts to find an 
inherent competitive bargaining structure. Neumann and Hirschhausen (2004) show that as 
liberalisation proceeds in the EU, contract durations tend to become significantly shorter; from 
an average of 25 years (contracts struck in the 1980s), the average is about 15 years in the 
beginning of this decade; 
• the industrial organisation literature analyzes the role of long-term contracts as compared with 
shorter-term trading. Using an auction model, Parsons (1989) was the first to quantify the 
“strategic” value of long-term contracts, i.e. the difference between the value of the gas in the 
long-term contract and the sale price in a more competitive market. Applying the model to 
long-term contracts in Russia, Norway, and Canada, Parson showed that the value of these 
contracts to the producer diminishes as the number of wholesale buyers is increased, an event 
typical for a liberalising gas sector. Along similar lines, Hartley and Brito (2001) applied a 
search model to derive that the duration of long-term contracts (here: in the LNG-industry) is 
likely to diminish with decreasing capital expenditures, with an increasing discount rate, 
falling transport costs, and a larger number of players in the market (suppliers and buyers). 
The theoretical industrial organization literature mainly addresses the issue in its relation to 
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market structure, i.e. whether long-term contracting favours competition or collusion. In a 
finite-horizon model, Allaz and Vila (1993) suggest that forward trading makes markets more 
competitive. Consumers benefit from long-term contracting, because at each contracting stage 
producers sell additional output. The smaller the quantity producers sell subsequently at the 
spot market, the lower will be their incentive to reduce production and therefore the price will 
be lower. This low price is anticipated in all previous contracting stages. Moving to collusive 
behaviour, Le Coq (2004) shows that in a setting of long-term contracts, but subsequent 
repeated interaction on the spot market, the contract market helps to sustain collusion on the 
spot market. Along similar lines, Liski and Montero (2004) find that in an infinitely-repeated 
oligopoly, the possibility of forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that 
otherwise would not be possible; this result holds both for price and quantity competition; 
• a third strand of the literature links long-term contract with infrastructure investments. Thus, 
when assessing the investment question in electricity generation, Oren (2003) argues that in 
principle price volatility should be mitigated in a well functioning market by forward 
contracting and other risk management practices, in order to secure long-term investment. 
However, vertical disintegration and regulation of some segments may result in improper 
distribution of risk along the electricity supply chain. Oren (2003, 8) concludes that 
”consequently some regulatory intervention (e.g. facilitating longer-term contracting for 
capacity), at least on a temporary basis, might be needed in order to achieve socially efficient 
risk management.“ Neuhoff and de Vries (2004) point to the question of competitive 
electricity supply companies – these are restricted from signing long-term contracts with their 
final consumers to facilitate switching and retail competition. But even without such 
constraints the Scandinavian experience shows that consumers prefer short-term contracts. 
Therefore, retail companies are not credible counter parties for long-term contracts with 
generation companies, because at times of excess supply and hence low spot prices, new retail 
companies could offer electricity to final customers at lower rates and existing retail 
companies would be unable to honour their long-term contracts. With competition in gas 
supply, a similar evolution might be anticipated in the gas sector. 
 
Clearly the discussion on long-term contracts also has a public policy component. Proponents of 
liberalisation regularly argue that a market based mainly on shorter-term contractual arrangements is 
compatible with long-term supply security as long as alternative trading arrangements, e.g. through 
spot markets, can be established. Hartley (2002) argues that liberalisation (in the UK) will not expose 
the UK to major supply risks concerning (Russian) gas,3 an opinion apparently shared by Odell (TISC, 
2002). On the other hand, critiques (and many practitioners) argue that liberalisation of access to 
 4
transmission and downstream infrastructure is incompatible with long-term supply security and that 
long-term contracts are put at risk by liberalisation (Wybrew, 2002). Without these contracts between 
exporters and wholesalers, price volatility would increase (Beckervordersandforth, 2004). The price 
risk for revenues from new gas field increases capital costs and delays investment until expected 
prices are higher; hence security of supply would be jeopardised. Furthermore the US experience of 
unanticipated supply shortages in recent years suggests that without large coverage of long-term 
contracts, aggregate supply is difficult to predict. This is particularly the case as gas producers - both 
individually and collectively - face an incentive to overstate future gas production in order to prevent 
entry, increase demand and then capture higher prices in a market with scarce supply. 
One might ask whether sellers or buyers have a higher interest in long-term contracts. From a buyers’ 
perspective, an institutional framework with increasing shares of energy bought at spot prices below 
the long-term contract price is considered favourable. In such a situation, buyers may not be interested 
in the “luxury” of expensive long-term contracts. The expectation of the disappearing destination 
clause leads to further expectation of price falls. On the other hand, buyers have an incentive to sign 
long-term contracts as a barrier to entry for new market entrants. Also, from the perspective of a gas 
importing country, long-term contracts struck by private importers include a positive external effect, in 
that they increase the security of supply. Governments may thus be willing to grant importers with 
long-term contracts specific advantages. The sellers’ view on long-term contracts is ambiguous. They 
are also concerned about the counter-party risk of contracting with commercial entities that might lose 
their franchised customer base in the process of liberalisation. In this case gas-importing companies 
committed to higher long-term contracting prices might not be able to bear the risk of enduring low 
spot prices. 
In this paper we shall build upon the theoretical industrial organization literature, in particular the 
Allaz and Vila (1983) model of forward contracting. Thus we leave aside other (important) topics, 
such as the institutional aspects, and contract types. We focus on long-term contracts at fixed prices. 
Further, we do not differentiate between long-term contracts and forward contracts but only require 
that either type cover a period exceeding the time required to build new production and transmission 
facilities. Producers that own the physical assets to deliver the gas can best carry the risk involved in 
forward contracts for gas imports to Europe for approximately ten years – hence producers would 
serve as main counter-party both for forward contracts and long-term contracts. The main difficulty 
with such long-term contracts is the counter-party risk. Frequently, contracting parties are concerned 
that the counter party will abandon the contract if it is more profitable to sell the gas in the spot 
market.4 With the emergence of liberalisation, and of additional liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 “There are good sources of gas available from close neighbours. … On the basis of reliable projections, the next 20 years do 
not look like years of real difficulty for the UK.” (Hartley, 2002, 23). 
4 For example, OPEC countries did not honour long-term contracts for oil exports when the spot price significantly exceeded 
the contracted price in 1979. As oil-exporting countries, the loss of reputation as financial credible counter parties had little 
implication as they did not need to access credit markets. At the same time they did not worry about punishment strategies as 
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the number of potential buyers is larger, and hence it is more likely that contractual arrangements will 
build on a flexible price; this observation is confirmed by traders (Cahagne, 2004). 
3 Some Empirical Evidence: the U.S. and Europe 
The liberalisation of the gas industries in the U.S. (1980s), the UK (1990s) and in continental 
European Union (ongoing) definitely impact the role of long-term supply contracts. We therefore 
analyze the developments of contracts and prices in the U.S., and look for similarities and differences 
with the current situation in continental Europe. We also derive a stylised relation between the 
institutional framework of the industry and the natural gas price, and discuss the current price structure 
prevailing in Europe. 
3.1 U.S. experience 
The US commenced liberalisation in the 1980s from a position of excess production capacity. 
Investment was further facilitated by a multi-tier price structure, put in place as a result of the gas 
shortage in the 1970s, that provided extra rewards for the development of new gas fields. The 1970s 
and 1980s were characterized by a complex web of field price regulation, fuel use restrictions and 
allocation rules, etc. Pipelines and gas distribution companies were obliged to rely on long-term 
contracts. In fact, the federal regulator (FERC) would not approve the construction of new pipelines 
without long-term gas supply and sales contracts in place. 
Liberalisation started with the Natural Gas Policy Act in 1978, which ended Federal control over 
wellhead prices of “new” gas as of 1985 (but kept in place wellhead price controls for previously 
contracted gas, IEA, 1998, 71 sq.). In 1985, FERC order 436 paved the way for competition by 
opening up access to the pipeline system. Subsequent orders continued the path of liberalisation, 
notably the “final restructuring” FERC order 636 (for a detailed account, see IEA, 1998). Natural gas 
consumption fell until 1986, but picked up thereafter as prices fell. 
In the decade following liberalisation, excess production capacity led to lower spot pricesFigure 1 
shows the development of natural gas wellhead prices (real terms) in the U.S. between 1982 and 2004 
- the period shortly before and after liberalisation.5 Falling gas prices also resulted from weak demand 
for natural gas. Both industrial consumption and utility consumption hit a trough in 1986/87.6 External 
supplies furthermore contributed to price reductions: Canadian pipeline gas exports to the U.S. 
increased in the late 1980s, and peaked only in 2000/01, to decline gradually thereafter. The sustained 
period of low prices came to an end in 2000, and most notably already before the Californian crisis, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
they could sell oil on the spot market to various parties. This experience is unlikely to directly translate to gas, as gas 
transport is cheapest by pipeline, and hence it is easier for importing companies to retaliate if a gas exporting country 
abandons a long-term contract. The experience with gas imports into Europe confirms that even during crisis times, the gas 
exporters put in significant efforts to honour their commercial contracts. 
5 Source: EIA. Note that price developments before 1982 were characteristic, too, with flat or only slowly rising prices until 
the early 1970s, which can be attributed to an oversupply of gas and only gradually increasing marginal costs. Gas prices 
exploded in 1973, parallel to the first oil shock. 
6 We are thankful to a referee for historical details on the U.S. natural gas market. 
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both driven by increased demand for newly built combined cycle gas turbines and subsequently lower 
than expected gas production. 
Following FERC Order 436 (1985), long-term contracts were no longer administratively required, and 
were largely abandoned. The share of gas supplies through long-term contacts was reduced from about 
100% to below 50%. Until 1991, the average contract volume fell from 1.27 cm/a to 0.24 bcm/a 
(International Energy Agency, 1998, 83). As gas demand picked up, and the „cheap” gas had been 
sold, prices rose once again. Prices were volatile, as heating demand varies with climatic conditions. 
Then, in the first years of this decade, North America was suddenly faced with rising prices, and hence 
an attempt to assure long-term contracts, both for pipeline gas and for LNG. Compared with the price 
level of the 1990s, prices have stayed high in the first half of this decade. NYMEX Futures price 
predictions indicate little change in the coming years: forward prices for 2010 are slightly higher than 
high prices of spring 2005 (December 2010 forward at about 6.50 USD/MBTU). The U.S. Energy 
Information Agency (EIA) expects prices in 2025 to be at a similarly level.7
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Figure 1: U.S. natural gas wellhead prices, 1982-2004 
Source: Energy Information Agency (EIA) 
 
                                                     
7 EIA (2005): Petroleum and Natural Gas Forecasts. url http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/petgas.html (called on the 27 May, 
2005). 
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3.2 A stylised model of price dynamics 
We now turn to the description of an ideal pattern of price developments from a world of excess 
supply and (regulated) long-term contracts, to a liberalised world, and moving on to a world of lacking 
long-term contracts. Figure 2: stylizes such a development: in the “old” world of cost-plus regulation 
(plus eventually regional monopoly concessions), gas trade was dominated by long-term contracts. 
Moreover, most contracts contained a flexibility clause, which was an additional driver against 
competitive entry. Now assume that liberalisation starts. Initially the entire market can be satisfied by 
the gas contracted in long-term contracts using the flexibility clause option. Sellers collude not to sell 
additional gas on the spot market, which is facilitated by the contract clause not to resell gas obtained 
on long-term contracts (“destination clause”). With decreasing contracting volumes and increasing 
demand, either the gas supplied on the take or pay plus flexibility contract does not satisfy demand, or 
some producer tries to increase its market share by selling outside of the flexibility clause. As it is 
observed by competitors, they follow the strategy and hence increasing gas volumes are sold at the 
spot market at decreasing prices. In the third period we can envisage two scenarios. Either the 
investment in production and transmission capacity decreases due to low spot prices and lack of new 
long-term contracting, such that marginal production costs and hence gas prices increase again. 
Alternatively, sellers sell a sufficiently small fraction of their gas on long-term contracts, to have large 
shares of their revenue dependent on the gas spot market price. In this scenario they are more likely to 
reduce output again to increase the spot market price. It is difficult to anticipate which of these two 
mechanisms will push up prices in period three.8 The price level will then depend on whether the 
institutional arrangement facilitates long-term contracts. Should this not be the case, then prices are 
likely to continue to rise. 
 
                                                     
8 In the US with a large share of independent producers the price increase is usually associated with scarcity of production 
capacity rather than strategic behaviour. 
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Figure 2: Stylised relation between the institutional context, contract structure, and the gas 
price 
3.3 European experience 
We are interested whether the development of long-term contracts in the U.S. is a singular event, or 
whether there are similarities to be expected in Europe. To some extent, the situation in Europe today 
resembles the situation in the U.S. one and a half decades ago: 
• Until recently, there was an oversupply of gas in Europe (“gas bubble”). Economic growth 
was lower than expected. Also, the gas prices linked to oil prices, slow liberalisation of gas 
transmission and balancing made gas generation more expensive, and prevented a full shift 
from coal to gas, the way observed in the UK. Third, previous regional monopolies had a 
strong incentive to ensure sufficient supply and might have over-contracted. This was 
exuberated as no exchange with neighbours was anticipated to resolve unilateral gas shortage; 
• a second aspect is the attempt by the European Commission to liberalise the industry 
following the EU-Directive 98/30/EC (1998), repealed in 2003 by the “Acceleration 
Directive” 2003/55/EC. The Acceleration Directive advocates third-party access to all 
essential facilities along the value-added chain (LNG-terminals, pipelines, storage, etc.), but 
also contains the possibility to grant exemptions, e.g. in cases where TPA would lead to 
„financial difficulties“ of the incumbent, or to distress regarding the security of supply (Art. 
21 of the Directive); 
• a third similarity is that as in the U.S, in Europe the volume of gas contracted on a long-term 
basis is shrinking. Given that the average size of the contracts has not changed significantly, 
the drop in contracted import volume results from a shortening of the average contract length, 
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from about 25 years in 1985, down to about 15 years (cf. Stern, 2002, and Neumann and von 
Hirschhausen, 2004, for a quantitative analysis);9 
• both Europe and the U.S. also have shared characteristics resulting from the emergence of 
international trade in LNG (liquefied natural gas). LNG is still slightly more expensive than 
pipeline gas, but costs are coming down. LNG has a much higher flexibility of supply: tanker 
capacities for transporting LNG is increasing, and an intensification of international trade is 
expected, eventually even the development of a deep spot market. The current role of LNG for 
EU imports is small (~ 10%) but rising, and it is important in specific countries, e.g. Spain and 
France, where LNG accounts for 60% and 25% of total imports, respectively (see IEA 2004, 
for details); 
• another indication for the changing nature of the European market is the evolution of the 
“flexibility clause”, which used to be an integral part of any long-term contract. The flexibility 
clause covered deliveries above the obligatory take-or-pay element in long-term gas contracts 
(the latter typically consisted of 80% of the nominal quantity of the contract). The option 
provided for an increase in delivery by 40%-points of the nominal quantity of the contract 
(therefore up to 120% of initial quantity) at a similar price level. The flexibility clause was 
also a method to commit producers to sell output above the long-term contract (80% of 
nominal level) at the indexed price, because all energy sold within the contract arrangement 
was sold at the predetermined price. Gas sector liberalisation, coupled with oversupply of gas, 
weakens the strategic role of the flexibility clause. This was the case in the U.S. in the 1980-
90s, and it is now increasingly observed in European long-term contracts. The flexibility 
clause is increasingly substituted by spot market purchases by the large trading companies. 
Traders confirm that they have shifted a significant part of their supply to spot markets, 
besides the National Balancing Point in the UK, on the continent this is Zeebrugge, but also 
the TTF and others. The proportion of contracts with spot prices is estimated to range from 15 
to 20%. Trading companies expect the share of spot sales to increase further. 
 
A comparison of current conditions in Europe with those in the U.S. implies that there is a good 
chance that Europe is experiencing a similar trend as the U.S. As the liberalisation of the European gas 
markets started with excess production capacity, we observe that the spot market prices, e.g. at 
Zeebrugge, were below the long-term contract prices until recently. Figure 3 illustrates that the prices 
                                                     
9 This might indicate that contracts mainly cover output from existing fields and only very profitable additional investment is 
funded. In contrast to the US with rather competitive gas production, European gas supplies are imported from regions which 
still have in place mechanisms to coordinate national export quantity, like the state monopoly on transmission capacity in 
Russia, Algeria’s state-owned gas industry, or even the Norwegian state-controlled gas export cartel (until recently). 
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deviate particularly during times of low gas demand (i.e. in the summer months).10 From March 2001 
till September 2003, spot prices were significantly below long-term prices as defined by pipe import 
prices. In particular, since September 2004, Zeebrugge spot prices have skyrocketed, to almost the 
equivalent of 6-7 USD/mBTU, whereas pipeline import prices, linked to lagged oil prices increases, 
are climbing only gradually. Also note that given U.S. forward prices of 6.50 USD/mBTU for 2010, 
there is a strong continuous upward pressure on European prices due to the competition for LNG in 
the Atlantic basin.11
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Figure 3: European gas prices: long-term gas imports and spot prices 
Source: Heren Report 
                                                     
10 We also observe that prices for imports via pipeline and LNG largely resembled each other until recently; whereas LNG 
import prices used to be slightly higher than pipeline gas imports, they were at par since 2001, indicating the increasing role 
of LNG in the European market. It is not clear what caused the high LNG import prices since summer 2004. 
11 An important companion issue that we have not treated in this paper, is the future price indexation of gas contracts. The 
current long-term contracts in Europe link the gas price to the oil price. The linkage increases incentives for large producers 
of both oil and gas to reduce oil production as they will benefit not only on the oil but also on the gas sales. The linkage 
furthermore facilitates negotiations for all gas producers, as it establishes a gas price on which to coordinate. However, the 
linkage has the disadvantage, both for exporting countries and most buyers, of producing volatile revenue and cost streams. It 
is expected that reduction of short-term substitutionopportunities between oil and gas that partially motivated the linkage, 
will result in a gradual or even a sudden shift away from the explicit oil-gas linkage. We could envisage that future long-term 
contracts will phase out the linkage, by either setting tighter upper and lower bounds up to which the gas price follows the oil 
price or by increasing the gas price only by a fraction of an oil price increase. In fact, this decoupling can be observed in 
recent long-term contracts, both for pipeline gas (Centrica-Statoil contract of 2002, indexed to the NBP), and for LNG (2004 
Rasgas contracts, indexed to the Zeebrugge spot price). 
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 Given the concentration of gas supply companies one might have expected that they withhold output 
during these times to retain higher spot market prices. As argued above the flexibility clause of the 
existing long-term contracts might have served initially as a commitment device not to sell outside of 
these long-term contracts and hence could have facilitated retaining high spot market prices until 
2001. As less long-term contract volumes are signed, gas exporters have less incentive to keep spot 
prices high to increase long-term contract prices. At the same time a large fraction of sales are covered 
withexisting take or pay contracts. Exporting countries only sell a small fraction of their output in the 
short-term market and hence face little incentives to keep spot prices high and hence spot prices 
dropped towards competitive levels at short-run marginal costs. 
3.4 Scenarios for Europe, short-run and long-run 
As argued in the last section, the volume of long-term contracts in Europe has fallen and is likely to 
continue to fall. Assume that for some time total production capacity will suffice to satisfy gas demand 
at short-run marginal production costs below today’s price level.12 Several changes could increase 
competition in the European gas market. If LNG prices continue to fall and LNG import capacities 
increase, then this could result in additional competition. Alternatively, if the Energy Charter or other 
developments induce Russia to grant free access to pipeline transmission capacity, then competition 
among Russian gas producers and exporters could increase. If Algeria goes ahead with privatisation of 
its oil and gas industry, then large foreign investments could increase its production capacity, and 
several exporting companies may emerge. Finally, new pipelines could allow gas producers from the 
Persian Gulf or the Caspian Sea to enter the European market.  
While the previous list considers the impact of changes outside of the European gas market on the 
competition between gas exporters, one can expect that the structure within the European gas market 
also influence how gas producers compete in supplying to the European market. One of the current 
obstacles for competition in the European market is the destination clause. Most long-term contracts 
between gas-exporters and European gas utilities bar buyers from reselling the gas to third parties 
other than final private and industrial consumers within their territory. In the appendix, we illustrate 
how the destination clause allowed gas producers to profitable price discriminate. The destination 
clause impacts competitiveness not only through prices, but also through a second channel, in that it 
reduces liquidity in the European gas market.13
The impact of some or all of these evolutions implies that – ceteris paribus – short-term prices will 
settle below the equilibrium price observed if all long-term contracts were abandoned.  Strategic 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
12 If this assumption is not satisfied, then we will directly move to the scenario where prices increase, as described above. 
13 If liquidity is lower, then it will be easier to identify individual transactions and also deviations from the collusive 
equilibrium. It is possible that the collusion takes the form of an (implicit) agreement among gas producers to serve distinct 
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producers reduce output from the competitive level until the marginal revenue loss of additional output 
reductions equals the gains on price increase of the remaining output. If some of the output is sold on 
long-term contracts, then the gains of a price increase on the remaining output is smaller, and the 
strategic producers are less prepared to accept losses on his output and will sell more output at lower 
prices. Hence the increase of competition can result in a larger price decrease if some of the output is 
still sold on long-term contracts than if all output were to be sold in spot sales. If however gas-spot 
prices fall significantly below long-term contract prices in a liberalised European natural gas market, 
and if the owners of the long-term contracts do not have long-term contracted or captive customers, 
then the gas producers will have to renegotiate their long-term contracts to a lower price. In such a 
situation the gas producers would be exposed to the price reduction on their entire output and, hence, 
be more inclined to retain high prices as they anticipate that price changes not only impact short-term 
sales but might also feed through to long-term sales. 
We now turn to the discussion of the long-term perspectives for Europe. We envisage that with limited 
long-term contracting, investment in gas production and import capacity will stay low and hence 
marginal production costs will increase, pushing up spot prices. International gas supply with a large 
fraction of the supply not covered by long-term contracts will create the following difficulties. First, 
with fewer long-term contracts there is a lack of long-term information about future production 
capabilities and costs.14 As much of European gas is imported from countries with far less openness in 
the information policy, uncertainty about predictions of future gas supplies is likely to be even higher. 
In addition if countries like Russia sell large fractions of their output on short-term contracts, then they 
have an incentive to overstate future gas production capacity to ensure high gas demand and low 
investment by competitors.15
Second, going beyond the commercial to the political framework, experience shows that gas producer 
countries were so far eager to honour their contractual arrangements and hence long-term contracts are 
of importance in ensuring that energy delivery, even from instable regions, is not interrupted.16 If we 
assume that gas producers within some of the producer countries can cooperate and hence individual 
companies can contribute significant shares to the overall production quantity, then long-term 
contracting can help to reduce this market power. If contracts are signed sufficient years before the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
regional sub-markets. Such an agreement only is useful in the context of the destination clause. Hence, to the extent that 
relaxing the destination clause could be seen to reduce the likelihood of a collusion, all consumers will benefit. 
14 In that respect, it is worth noting that even in countries which publish a lot of information, like the UK and USA, the 
predictions about medium and long-term gas supply have changed within the period of only one or two years, eg Kemp 
(2002) for forecasts on UK gas production, and EIA (2004) for the U.S.; Costello, Huntington, and Wilson (2005) report 
changes of demand projections of similar magnitude for the U.S. 
15 If subsequent production is below the announced level, then Russian gas producers benefit from the higher gas prices. In 
contrast, if Russian production were fully covered by long-term contracts, then Russian producers would have a strong 
incentive to produce the contracted amounts, otherwise they might have to acquire replacement gas in a short market to 
honour their contracts. 
16 If gas would be sold in short term contracts, then political developments would be more likely to induce governments to 
interrupt gas exports or pipeline transit. Without long-term contracts such activity would not constitute a breach of 
international agreements, and impact the credit ratings of the respective country or jeopardise future gas trade with the 
limited number of importing countries that are accessible via pipeline. 
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delivery date then the number of competitors is larger. Gas projects in third countries either with 
pipeline or LNG delivery could offer viable alternatives. Likewise small producers could offer to 
expand their production if long-term prices make such projects viable. 
 
4 The Model: Long-term and Short-term Demand 
Our model builds on Allaz and Vila (1993) who suggested an additional reason why contracting might 
reduce market power. Allaz and Vila show that in a Cournot setting, oligopoly producers with the 
opportunity to sell future output during several contracting stages will sell some of this output at each 
stage to pre-empt competitors. Hence to pre-empt the market they will sign long-term contracts, even 
though in their model the aggregate impact is that the volume of output traded in the final spot market 
is low and hence the incentive to withhold output is likewise low. The resulting low spot prices are 
anticipated and hence even the long-term contracts are signed at lower prices. If producers could 
collude not to sign long-term contracts, then they would be better off while it is individually rational to 
sign some long-term contracts at every contracting stage.  
While the previous argumentation pointed to benefits for consumer countries from long-term gas 
contracts, it is likely that producer countries, too, can benefit from long-term contracts. One 
assumption inherent in the Allaz and Villa argumentation is that long-term and short-term demand 
elasticities coincide. However, in the long-term both industry and consumers invest in new production 
facilities and renovate heating installations. This typically determines the fuel type. Thus, the expected 
long-term energy price of gas has a large impact on the future gas demand. By contrast, in the short 
run only few electricity generators and industrial installations can switch between different fuel types 
and most of production and consumption decisions are only influenced by the energy price to a small 
degree. Hence short run gas demand is rather price inelastic. 
The following model assesses the impact of differing long and short run demand elasticity. It will 
show that oligopoly producers benefit from long-term contracts. Without long-term contracts all gas 
will be sold in the short-term market and given the low short-term demand elasticity the oligopoly 
producers will charge high prices. In expectation of these high prices consumers will not choose gas as 
their fuel and hence oligopoly producers will sell low quantities. With the opportunity to sell gas with 
long-term contracts producers already commit some of their output. Hence they will sell less output in 
the short-term market and face smaller incentives to withhold output in the short-term market.  
Accordingly the short-term price is lower. The lower short-term price feeds back to the long-term 
market. As prices are lower more consumers choose gas as fuel and oligopoly producers serve a larger 
market. If the difference between short-term and long-term demand elasticity is large enough, then 
profits of oligopoly producers increase with long-term contracting. 
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We use a two-stage model (Figure 4). Oligopoly producers decide on the quantity xi they sell forward. 
Consumers determine their investment in long-term equipment and thus set the expected demand Qe. 
In the short term market producers sell output qi-xi and the market clearing price ps is established. We 
assume complete information, perfect foresight and no uncertainty. 
• Long term 
contracting: xi
• Long-term fuel 
choice based on 
expected ps, 
determines Qe
pl
(= ps rational expectations)
ps
• Short term sales 
qi-xi
 
Figure 4 Time line of two stage contracting game 
Assuming that total production and consumption is Q, then the inverse long-term demand curve is 
given by demand intercept A and demand slope b: 
.
b
QApl
−=          (1) 
Short-term demand is more price responsive and hence demand slope scaled by 1>γ  and demand 
intercept shifted to A’: 
.'
b
QAps
−= γ          (2) 
We assume rational expectations and hence require that the long-term price (1) coincides with the 
short-term price (2) at the expected production Qe. Hence it follows that γ
γ eQAA )1(' −+=  and (2) 
turns into 
.)1(
b
Q
b
QAp es γγ −−+=        (3) 
To facilitate the calculations, we assume constant marginal costs, which we can normalise to zero, and 
n symmetric producers with production qi of which xi is long-term contracted. We solve the model 
using backward induction and start with profit function of each of the producers in the spot market. At 
this stage the contract volume xi and the expected production Qe are fixed: 
.)()( siii pxqq −=π  
Substituting from (3) and using the first order condition to identify the profit maximising output 
quantity we obtain: 
 .)1(
)1(2)(0
b
QA
b
qnxq
q
q ejii
i
i −++−+−−=∂
∂≡ γγπ    (4) 
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Producers anticipate in the long-term market their impact of contracting on their own output qi and 
others’ output qj. We calculate both by substituting Qe=(n-1)qj+qi in (4). A similar calculation also 
gives qj: 
.
11
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−+=+
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n
qxA
q
qnxA
q ijj
ji
i γ
γ
γ
γ
 
Solving these two equations for the qi, qj gives: 
 .      
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i    (5) 
The expressions for the short-term equilibrium allows us to calculate the long-term contracting 
decisions xi of producers in the first stage, using (1) for p:  
.
)()()1(
)()()(
b
xqxqnA
xqpxqx iiijiiiii
−−−==π     (6) 
Substituting (5) in (6), differentiating with respect to xi to obtain the profit maximising long-term 
contract volume and then using the symmetry among all producers gives: 
 .
)1(
2
2 Annn
nxi −++
−+= γ
γ
       (7) 
And the corresponding equilibrium output quantity, price and profits are: 
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Alternatively, if no long-term contracts are signed, the equilibrium output quantity and prices can be 
obtained by setting xi=0 in (5). 
( ) .     )(      q 2
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A
nb
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n
A
    (9) 
 
Figure 5 compares profits in both cases as relationship between long-term and short-term demand 
elasticity γ changes for fixed A = 10, b=1 and n = 2. For small γ the market power mitigating effect of 
long-term contracting dominates and producers benefit from pure spot market trading. If γ exceeds 4.8, 
then the benefits of the larger market dominate and oligopolists benefits from long-term contracting.  
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Figure 5 Total profits of oligopolists in market with and without long-term contracting 
 
Consumers continue to benefit from long-term contracting for all γ, as prices are lower under long-
term contracting (8) than with pure spot sales (9). Likewise well-fare is always higher with long-term 
contracts, as the deadweight loss of market power increases monotonously in the excess of market 
price over production costs.  
Comparing the profits of producers in the scenario with and without long-term contracts shows that 
the ratio γ of short-term to long-term demand elasticity required to ensure producers benefit from long-
term contracting is only a function of the number of producers n. As the analytic expression is too 
complex, Figure 6 shows the numeric result. With an increasing number of players long-term demand 
hast to be increasingly more elastic relative to short-term demand.  
54321
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Figure 6 Critical ratio of long-term to short-term demand elasticity 
 
The empirical evidence on demand elasticity is scattered. Al-Sahlawi (1989) reports that the ratio of 
long-run price elasticity to short-run price elasticity is in the range of 4-5 for industrial gas demand, 
and in the range of 5-10 for residential and commercial natural gas demand. Estrada and Fugleberg 
(1989) report similar ratios in a comparative study on natural gas price elasticities in France and in 
Germany. Overall, the long-term perspective suggests that in markets with a duopoly structure 
consumers and producers benefit from the strategic function of long-term contracts. 
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 5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed the economics of long-term gas contracts both from a theoretical point 
of view, and with particular emphasis on the situation in Europe. Lessons from the U.S. suggest that 
the scope for long-term contracts is reduced in the aftermath of liberalisation. However, as time passes 
on, supply may become shorter, prices may rise, and large consumers and wholesale traders may 
become weary of the situation, and are then more willing to re-engage in long-term contracts. Our 
model shows that producers also have a strategic incentive to engage in long-term contracts if long-run 
price elasticity of demand is significantly higher than the short-run demand elasticity. 
Given the structural changes that the European natural gas industry is currently undergoing, one can 
conclude that long-term contracts will remain an important element of the European natural gas 
industry, but that in the short term, their role in the supply mix is likely to diminish. The relevant 
policy question to which our paper hints is: what institutional arrangement would be most appropriate 
to ensure that one can sign long-term contracts with producers in gas-exporting countries, while at the 
same time reaping the benefits from gas sector liberalisation? 
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Appendix 
We will assess how the destination clause allows producers to profit from price discrimination, and a 
potential consequence of abandoning the destination clause. 
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Figure 7: A model to assess the impact of the destination clause 
 
We assume that Europe consists of two regions i=1,2, (see Figure 7), each with demand Di which is 
for algebraic simplicity assumed to be a linear function of the regional price pi. 
 
 Di(pi) =Ai-bipi           (1) 
 
Two gas producers with constant and identical marginal costs, c, deliver energy to both markets (see 
Figure 7). Producer A incurs unit costs ti to deliver to region i. Producer B incurs costs t1 to deliver to 
region 2 and t2 to deliver to region 1.The profits of producer 1 are therefore: 
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 πA=(p1-t1-c)QA,1+(p2-t2-c)DAQA,2.        (2) 
 
Using Di=QA,i+QB,i, in (1) substituting in (2) and differentiating with respect to pi gives the optimal 
output quantities conditional on the production of producer B: 
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Using the symmetric equations for producer B and substituting QB,i in (3) gives: 
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Equation (4) and symmetric equations for sales to region 2 can be used to calculate the equilibrium 
profits for producer A: 
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If we now relax the destination clause, then producers face the aggregate demand: 
 
 D=A1+A2-(b1+b2)p.         (6) 
 
and identical transmission costs for export to both countries. A similar calculation as before gives for 
the profit of producer A: 
 
 
( )( )
.
3
1 22121
21
, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++−+
+=
ctbbAA
bbRA
π       (7) 
 
First, assume regions and transmission costs are symmetric. A1=A2, b1=b2, t1=t2. In this case we obtain 
that πA,R=πA, therefore relaxing the destination clause has no impact on profits and, as can be shown, 
on output and consumption. 
Second, assume transportation costs are symmetric t1=t2, but region 2 is half the size of region 1 with 
similar composition of customers and, thus, elasticities: A1=2A2, b1=2b2. We again obtain that πA,R=πA. 
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    Third, assume that demand is more elastic in region 2. A1=A2, t1=t2, b1=γb2 and γ>1. We obtain 
from (5) and (7) that the profits for each of the producers are higher with the destination clause than if 
it is relaxed:  
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The difference in profits is increasing in γ>1 and hence the more demand elasticity differs between the 
regions, the more profitable is the opportunity to price differentiate between regions for the 
oligopolists using the destination clause. 
Finally assume that transport costs differ and t1=δt2. Assuming otherwise symmetric countries and 
almost symmetric flows we set in first approximation t=(t1+t2)/2, and obtain for the duopolist that he 
can profit from the destination clause as follows:  
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The analysis shows, that the destination clause allows producers to profitable price discriminate in the 
gas industry if transport costs to or demand elasticities in the regions are asymmetric. This would 
explain the interest of producers in retaining destination clauses. 
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